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State Trading versus Export
Subsidies: The Case of
Canadian Wheat
Julian M. Alston and Richard Gray
Canada  and the United  States have  used different trade policies to support their
wheat  industries.  Canada  conferred  sole export  powers  to the  Canadian  Wheat
Board, allowing it to price discriminate among markets. The U.S.  government has
funded transfers  to its wheat  producers from  taxpayers,  instead,  through  export
subsidies. This study compares these two ways of supporting producers in terms of
their transfer efficiency  and overall deadweight losses,  the incidence  on  different
domestic  interest groups,  and their consequences  for  third-party traders.  In the
analysis we consider the implications of market power of wheat marketing firms for
the comparison of  policy alternatives in the context of the Canadian wheat industry.
Key words: Canadian Wheat Board, export subsidies, imperfect competition, state
traders, transfer efficiency
Introduction
In the wake of the Uruguay Round Agreement adopted in 1995, the attention of many
economists has shifted from the analysis of traditional trade-distorting policies toward
less-traditional topics such as state-trading enterprises (STEs). As documented by Dixit
and Josling,  STEs are important  in agricultural  commodity trade  and might enable
member countries to circumvent their Uruguay-round commitments. In this study, we
suggest that the creation of an STE can be viewed usefully as a policy designed to redis-
tribute income toward domestic producers.  On that basis, we can compare STEs with
other redistributive policies in terms of their effects on total economic welfare and its
distribution among domestic producers, consumers, middlemen, and taxpayers, as well
as, perhaps, their overseas counterparts.
In the analysis below, we develop a model of the type used by Gardner to compare
policy alternatives in terms of their redistributive  efficiency.  We compare a statutory
authority  with  sole export  powers,  like the  Canadian Wheat  Board  (CWB),  and  an
export  subsidy  program,  like  the  U.S.  Export  Enhancement  Program  (EEP).1 The
theoretical analysis is cast in general terms, but we illustrate the basic ideas and derive
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specific results using a simulation model of the Canadian wheat market, and we explore
the implications of the form of competition in the wheat marketing sector. In both the
theoretical and empirical  work,  we maintain several  simplifying assumptions  impli-
citly. Importantly,  like almost all work of this type, we make no allowance for costs of
administration, enforcement, or compliance with policies. This omission may distort the
comparison if the statutory marketing authority is less efficient (e.g., as suggested by
Carter, Loyns, and Berwald) or more efficient (e.g., as suggested by Kraft, Furtan, and
Tyrchniewicz)  than its private-sector  counterparts,  or if the administrative  costs  of
export subsidies are significant.
Sole  Export Powers versus Export Subsidies
in a Competitive Market
A Small-Country Exporter
The simplest case to consider is one of a small-country exporter that faces a downward-
sloping domestic demand and a perfectly elastic export demand. In figure  1, Dd repre-
sents domestic demand,  De represents  export demand  at the world price (P,), and S
represents supply. The undistorted equilibrium results in consumption of C0, production
of Q0, and exports of E  = Q0 - Co. When a subsidy on exports (t per unit) is introduced,
production increases to Q1, consumption falls to C1, and exports rise to E1 = Q1 - C1. Pro-
ducers gain (A +B +  C +D), domestic consumers lose (A +B +  C), and, assuming taxpayer
losses are equal to the amount of subsidy expenditure, taxpayers lose (C +D +E),  with
a deadweight loss of(C + E). If, alternatively (as modeled by Gardner and by Alston and
Hurd), a dollar of government spending costs (1 + 6) dollars of taxpayer surplus (where 6
represents the marginal excess burden), the taxpayer cost becomes  (1 +  6)(C +D  +  E) and
the total deadweight loss from the export subsidy is  (1 + 6)(C +E) +  6D.
An alternative way to finance the same benefit to producers is to collect a tax from
domestic consumers  of Pd - P,  per unit and to use  the revenue  raised by this tax to
finance  an output subsidy of Pp - P,  per unit.2 Or, equivalently, a consumption tax of
Pd - P  per unit could be  used to finance  an export  subsidy of Pp - P,  per unit  (e.g.,
Alston and Freebairn; Sieper). Another way to achieve  exactly the same outcome is to
establish  an authority that can price  discriminate  between the domestic  and export
markets,  and  which  pools  the  proceeds  to  return a  weighted  average  price  (Pp) to
producers.  (It is assumed that the domestic market can be separated  from the world
market by transport costs or some other policy that prevents arbitrage from completely
equalizing prices.) Although the producer welfare effect of  these alternatives is the same
as for an export subsidy (of Pp - P,  per unit) financed from general revenues, the effects
on other groups are different since the price-pooling scheme involves a loss to consumers
but no cost to taxpayers.
The welfare  effects of the two policies are summarized  and contrasted in table 1.  In
terms of overall deadweight losses for the given transfer to producers, if 6 = 0, the export
2 Figure  1 is constructed so that the subsidy  exactly exhausts the tax, which  is also true for any other point along the
pooled-price  line D,  given the domestic  price ()  and the  e world price (P.  These relationships are developed in detail by
Alston and Freebairn  for both the large- and small-country cases.
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Figure 1.  A small-country comparison of pooling and
export subsidies
Table 1.  Welfare Effects of Export Subsidy versus Price Pooling in a Small
Open Economy
Policy  Consumer Cost  Taxpayer Cost  Net Social Cost
Price-Pooling Scheme  (A +B +C  +F +G)  0  (B +  C +  G +E)
<-------------------  6=0  -------------------- >
Export Subsidy  (A +B +C)  (C +D +E)  (C +E)
Difference  (F  +G)  -(C+D+E)  (B +G)
<--------------------  6>0 -------------------- >
Export Subsidy  (A +B +C)  (1 + 6)(C +D +E)  (C +E) + 6(C +D  +E)
Difference  (F  +G)  -(1  +  6)(C +D +E)  (B +G) - 8(C +D +E)
Notes: The entries in this table correspond to the areas of surplus changes in figure 1  associated with an
increase of producer surplus of area (A + B + C +  D). The alphabetical letters refer to areas in the figure,
and 6 represents the marginal deadweight cost per dollar of government spending.  The net social  cost
is  equal to the consumer  cost plus the taxpayer cost minus the benefit to  producers.  By construction,
F =  B +  C +  D +  E.
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subsidy is clearly more efficient than the pooling scheme; however, if 6 > 0, the pooling
scheme might be more efficient.  The comparison hinges on the relative sizes of the two
deadweight losses: (B +  C +  G +E) under the pooling scheme versus (C +E) +  6(C +D +E)
for the export subsidy. To compare these areas, we use the fact that, in figure 1, (A +F) =
(A +B +C +D +E).  It  can be  seen that the export  subsidy will  tend to be  favored  for
scenarios with (a) a larger transfer to producers, (b) a larger domestic share, (c)  a more
elastic domestic demand, and (d) a smaller value of the deadweight losses from general
taxation, 6. 3
A Large-Country  Exporter
Next, we compare a price-discrimination and pooling scheme with an export subsidy that
has the same effect on producer welfare, but in a case where export quantity affects the
export price. Like Alston, Carter, and Smith, we hold producer benefits, output, and the
output price constant, and focus on the implications of the different instruments for the
allocation of the given output (Q1) between domestic and export markets, and the associ-
ated price wedges, and we assume export demand is more elastic than domestic demand.
Suppose a total quantity of Q1 (greater than the competitive quantity) is produced at
a producer price of P  and allocated between domestic and export markets. In figure 2,
Dd  measures  domestic  consumption quantities  relative  to the  origin at  0,  while De
measures export quantities relative to the origin at Q1, so that any point along the quan-
tity axis defines a quantity of exports and a corresponding quantity of domestic sales
that together exhaust Q1.
Output of Q1 could be achieved  by providing an output subsidy of Pp - Pc per unit,
which would yield a producer price of P,, a domestic and export consumer price of P,
exports of E1, and domestic consumption of C1. With an output subsidy, domestic con-
sumer and export prices are equal, and the domestic and export allocation is given by
the intersection of the two demands. In contrast, the policies being studied here involve
price wedges between domestic and export markets. For instance, a pure export subsidy
would raise the domestic consumer price to Pp and would reduce domestic sales from C1
to C2, requiring exports of E2 to clear the market.  In order to induce exports  of E2, the
export price must be reduced to Pe,  and this requires an export subsidy of Pp - Pe per
unit (see Alston, Carter, and Smith). Alternatively, consider a price-pooling scheme that
achieves the same outcome for producers. The unique domestic consumption price that
will achieve this outcome is Pd, which would further reduce domestic sales to C3, requir-
ing even more exports (of E3) to clear the market. In order to induce exports of E3, the
export  price  must be  reduced to  Pe,  and this requires  an  implicit export  subsidy  of
Pp  - Pe  per unit.
Holding the effects on producers constant, relative to the output subsidy of Pp - Pc,
an export subsidy of Pp - Pe involves losses to foreign exporters that are outweighed by
3Let TC 
=(Pd-P  )/Pd,  TQ  =  (Pp -P)/Pp,  and the domestic quantity share be kd = C 2/Q.  By construction,  Tc =  TQ(Pp/Pd)kd  (such
that A +F =A +B +  C +D +E). As shown in table 1, the deadweight loss from pooling is greater than the deadweight loss from
the equivalent export subsidy if (B +  G) > 6(C +D +E). B +  G, as a fraction of the total revenue to producers  (PpQ,), is (B +G)/
(PpQj) =  1/2TITcQ(l -k2),  where  T1  is the  absolute value  of the  elasticity of domestic demand  evaluated  at C 2. Similarly,
6(C +D +E),  as a fraction of the value of production, is 6(C +D +E)/(PpQ 1) = 
6TQ(1 -kd)(1 -kdTc).Thus,  the export subsidy is
more efficient than pooling if ½/2irCQ(1 +  kd) > 6rQ(l -kdrc); that is, if ½/2 Tc(l +  kd)/(l  -kd  C) > 6. Equivalently, the export sub-
sidy is more efficient if  1/2TQPpIkd(Pd - TQPp) > 6.
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Figure 2.  A large-country comparison of pooling and
export subsidies
benefits to foreign importers. This results in a net benefit to foreigners. In the country
of interest, the same comparison involves a loss of consumer surplus, savings to tax-
payers, and a domestic deadweight loss equal to the shaded area dgPPefe.  This ignores
deadweight losses  from taxation.  Relative  to the output subsidy,  the export subsidy
saves  6(Pp - P,)Q 1 but adds 6(Pp - Pe)E2 in deadweight losses from taxation. The move-
ment to a pooling scheme can be viewed as a further movement in the same direction:
a further reduction in the burden on taxpayers  and a further increase in the required
implicit tax on domestic consumers  in order to achieve the given gain for producers.
Relative  to  the  export  subsidy,  the  pooling  scheme  saves  deadweight  losses  from
taxation elsewhere in the economy equal to  6(Pp - Pe)E 2 in exchange for an increase in
the  deadweight  losses  from  implicitly  taxing  domestic  consumers  and  subsidizing
exports, by an amount equal to the shaded area agPcPe'c  (which is similar in shape to
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It can be seen from figure 2 that the pooling scheme is less likely to be a more efficient
transfer mechanism than an equivalent export subsidy, when export demand is less
elastic, when 6 is greater,  and when the domestic market share is greater.  A further
difference  is that the pooling policy involves  a larger per unit  (implicit) subsidy  on
exports, and this will have greater negative effects on third-country exporters (hidden
in the aggregate export demand) than the simple export subsidy policy.
Many Export Markets
The analysis above has allowed for only a single export market with a single price for
all exports regardless of their destination. The same basic ideas may be extended readily
into a setting with multiple, separable export markets and possibilities for discrimin-
atory pricing.  The relevant comparison now is between a marketing board that price
discriminates  among markets (and equates marginal revenues  among domestic  and
export markets to maximize profits) and a discriminatory (or targeted) export subsidy,
where different  rates of export subsidy apply to different overseas  destinations.  The
latter policy can be viewed as being equivalent to an output subsidy combined with a set
of discriminatory taxes. Equating marginal revenues among markets can be optimal for
this policy, too (e.g., Abbott, Paarlberg, and Sharples). Again, the essential difference
is that the discriminatory export subsidy involves taxpayer costs, whereas the market-
ing board must finance implicit subsidies of some markets by implicit taxes on others.
This is achieved through price discrimination.
As in the case of a single export market, to achieve the same result for producers with
a marketing board requires a larger effective  rate of price discrimination.  If domestic
demand happens  to be less elastic, this means a larger implicit export subsidy under
pooling (i.e., since the domestic market necessarily absorbs less when it is being taxed
to finance export subsidies, more exports and a higher average rate of export subsidy
are required to clear a given total quantity produced). The open border with the United
States means that the domestic Canadian market is not the least elastic  among all
markets for Canadian wheat. Hence, a higher rate of price discrimination under pooling
might not mean lower export prices generally, although it will mean lower prices on the
most elastic export markets.
Implications of Imperfectly Competitive
Marketing Firms
Some say that the grain trade is highly concentrated,  and that, in the absence of the
Canadian Wheat Board, middlemen would take excessive  profits out of income that is
currently being returned to growers by the CWB.4 The potential for substantial distor-
tions from the exercise of market power in grain merchandising is uncertain, but even
a small amount of market power might have important qualitative and quantitative
implications for our analysis.
4 For instance,  Scoppola (p.  13, table 1) reported four-firm concentration ratios in the U.S. and EC wheat export markets
of 70% and 90%,  respectively, based on 1985-88 data. Thursby reported a comparable  U.S. figure of 61% based on 1974-75
data. More recent data would suggest that the wheat trade has become more concentrated  over time.
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Figure 3.  Monopoly-monopsony  and pooling versus export
subsidies by a small exporter
A Small-Country Exporter
To illustrate the likely directions of the effects of market power of middlemen, we begin
with a small-country exporter, and an extreme form of competition: a single marketing
firm that is a monopsonist on the buying  side and a monopolist on the selling  side.
The  small-country  assumption  allows  us to  consider  domestic  demand  and  supply
independently-so, in figure 3, panel (b) represents domestic consumption and panel (a)
represents domestic production.
In figure 3, Q0 represents competitive output at the world price (P.),  which would in-
crease to Q1 given an export subsidy of t per unit that would raise the incentive price to
producers to Pp. In contrast, in a monopsony market, middlemen would sell Qo at P, and
would return Pf to producers, keeping (Pa - P )Qo as monopsony profit. Then, the intro-
duction of the same export subsidy would result in an increase in production to Q[ and
an increase in the producer price to Pf'. The same per unit subsidy would entail a smaller
gain to producers than under competition, and a corresponding subsidy-induced increase
in monopsony profit and in the deadweight loss from monopsony would be observed.
In contrast, the introduction of a marketing board with powers of acquisition  and
pooling would eliminate the monopsony. Thus, producers would gain not only from the
subsidy (A +B +  C) but also from the elimination of the monopsony(E +F  +  G +H  +I +J +K).
Further, the reduction in the deadweight loss from monopsony  (G +H  +K) may be greater
than the loss from the subsidy-induced distortion in production (D). Of course, the full
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social costs would count distortions in consumption as well. In figure 3, panel (b), con-
sumption would be C 0 at the world price, and C 1 at the domestic price given an export
subsidy of t per unit.  On the other hand, a monopolist would restrict domestic sales
to C', given an export price of Pp  ,  or C', given an export return of Pp =  Pi  +  t. The con-
sumer burden from the export subsidy is smaller under monopoly (which had already
caused a reduction  in consumption).  Consumers  lose the area (L +M+N)  when their
price increases from Pd to PJ, which is lesst  than the area (S + T + U +  V+ W). In addition,
the subsidy reduces monopoly profits, from (O +P  +  Q +S +T+  U) to (L +M  +O +P),  and
reduces the deadweight loss from monopoly,  from (R +  V +  W)  to (R +  Q +N).
While a marketing board would replace the monopoly, it might not act much differ-
ently from a monopoly. Thus, the introduction of a marketing board with a mandate to
raise the effective producer returns to Pp can be seen as serving to preserve the domestic
market monopoly and change the disposition of the monopoly profit. Indeed, if Pd (the
price that maximizes monopoly profits) happened to be the unique domestic price that
would yield a pool price of Pp, then the introduction of a board would leave the domestic
consumption  price  and quantity  unaffected.  More  generally,  the two  prices will  not
coincide,  and  the introduction  of the marketing board  could lead to  a reduction  or
an increase in the  domestic consumer  price  and in the  social  cost of distortions in
consumption.
These comparisons  have  not considered the implications  of the deadweight  losses
from taxation to finance  export subsidies. A complete comparison  of the alternatives
would also consider 6 > 0.
Extensions to Other Market Settings
We can also allow for monopoly-monopsony power in settings where the exporting coun-
try can determine price in one or more export markets  (i.e., a large-country  exporter).
The  implications  here  will  be  similar  to  those  in the  small-country  case.  That  is,
introduction of a marketing board can benefit producers  and society as a whole if it
serves to eliminate distortions from the exercise of market power on the buying side by
middlemen. Moreover, if monopsony power exists in the market, the transfer efficiency
of export subsidies  is reduced because  some  of the subsidy is captured as additional
monopsony profit and the subsidy leads to an exacerbation of deadweight losses from
monopsony.  In contrast, an export subsidy diminishes distortions from the exercise of
monopoly  power  on  the  selling  side  and,  as a  result,  the  existence  of a  monopoly
enhances the transfer efficiency of an export subsidy.  On the demand side, the switch
from a pure monopoly to a marketing board that sets the same price amounts to a lump-
sum  transfer  of  monopoly  rents  from  middlemen  to  producers-a  highly  efficient
transfer mechanism. More generally, the marketing board's price (for a given transfer
to producers)  will not be the  same  as the monopoly  price.  Nevertheless,  for similar
reasons, the transfer efficiency of the introduction of a marketing board should be much
increased when the board replaces a domestic monopoly.
A further dimension for extensions is to consider in-between cases of market power,
using oligopoly-oligopsony models. A tractable representation can be achieved by assum-
ing a fixed number of symmetric (identical) marketing firms,  so that we can represent
their actions with market  power parameters  that play the same  role as conjectural
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variations parameters. Thus, following Huang and Sexton, in a closed economy with a
consumer price (P), a farm product price (W), and a fixed per unit marketing cost (c), the
market clearing conditions become:
(1)  (  n-  )  (  .)
where 1i  is the absolute value of the demand elasticity, e is the supply elasticity, i is an
index of oligopoly power,  0 is an index of oligopsony power, and the units are chosen so
that the farm and retail quantities are identical.  The  same equation can be written,
alternatively, as
(2)  ,MR(Q)  + (1-  ~)D(Q)  = OMC(Q)  + (1-  O)S(Q)  + c,
which shows that the equilibrium is given by the intersection of one curve, i.e., a weight-
ed average  of the demand  curve  D(Q) and the marginal revenue  curve MR(Q),  and
another curve, i.e., a weighted average of the supply curve S(Q) and the marginal cost
curve MC(Q). The weights are the market power parameters:  0 < i,  0 < 1. In addition,
the same view of competition can be used to represent multiple sources of supply with
multiple destinations.
A Simulation Model
To investigate the issues raised  above, we  developed  an empirical  regional model  of
Canadian wheat production,  consumption, policy, and trade. Implicitly it is assumed
that Canadian wheat is differentiated  from other countries' wheat,  so that we do not
model  the world  wheat  economy;  instead,  we  restrict attention  to the  markets  for
Canadian wheat. The model includes eight specific importer markets, defined by distin-
guishing among food aid, the U.S. market, three other classes of commercial markets,
and three classes of markets in which Export Enhancement Program subsidies applied
in the year of interest, 1991/92.
General  Form of Model
The supply and demand equations are represented by linear approximations with elasti-
cities at the point of approximation (the "base" case of the observed policy, prices, and
quantities) used to parameterize the curves. The model is closed with a set of quantity-
clearing identities and price-policy rules that define the behavior of the Canadian Wheat
Board and  the Canadian  government.  The model  was  defined  and solved  using the
Solver option of Microsoft EXCEL.
The  simulation model  requires  a  demand elasticity  (ri)  for each  of the importing
countries  and Canada,  and a supply elasticity  (e)  for Canada.  These elasticities  and
initial market data on prices and quantities allow specification of the linear model under
competition. When we wish to model imperfect competition, we need to define oligopoly
power parameters (i)  for each of the importing countries and Canada, and an oligopsony
power parameter  (0) for Canada. Finally, it is necessary to define the CWB policy. The
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CWB has sole export powers and theoretically can discriminate among export markets.
To simplify the analysis, the CWB is modeled as though the agency maximizes gross
revenue from the sale of the crop, by equating marginal revenues  across markets, and
returns producers an incentive price that is equal to the average revenue thus obtained.5
Specification of the Underlying  Market Parameters
To establish the specific effects  of various export-marketing  structures  is largely an
empirical problem. We need information regarding the demand conditions that prevail
and the extent to which the markets are separable and price discrimination is possible.
Given that price  discrimination is possible only for noncompetitive  sellers, obtaining
relevant data is difficult. To define the demand parameters, we used data derived from
CWB sales for the 1991/92 crop year by Kraft, Furtan, and Tyrchniewicz  [(KFT), p. 42,
figure 4.3.2], which were provided to us by the CWB for this purpose. This was a period
in which the U.S. Export Enhancement Program was in effect,  and the resulting esti-
mates of parameters  of demand for Canadian wheat, facing the  CWB, are conditioned
by the prevailing U.S. policy of discriminatory export subsidies and its implications for
premiums and discounts.  More  specifically,  the potential for price discrimination  by
Canada was influenced by the U.S. EEP policy,  so that our estimates  should not be
interpreted as applying in a world without the U.S. EEP in effect.
The data indicate the quantity sold and the premium (or discount) relative to com-
mercial prices for all grade 1 Canadian Western Red Spring (#1 CWRS) wheat exported
into non-EEP markets during the 1991/92 crop year.6 The premium was calculated for
each sale as the difference  between the actual transacted  price  and the  thcommercial
asking prices for similar grades on the day when the  n the sale was made. (We also conducted
simulations  after cutting each premium and the observed EEP subsidies in half, with
correspondingly much more conservative possibilities for price discrimination, since the
KFT results have been controversial.)  Note that all premia and prices reported are in
U.S. dollars.
The quantity of exports to the United States, 580,000 tonnes, appears in the CWB
annual report.  KFT report that, during the  1991/92  crop year, "many of the  1991/92
sales with low or no premiums were to U.S. buyers" (p. 39). The CWB provided a separ-
ate listing of U.S. sales, which allowed us to calculatee an average premium of $0.19 per
tonne sold into the U.S. market.  The premium for each of the three  segments  of the
(non-U.S.)  commercial market  was calculated  by first ordering  sales  on the basis  of
premium, then dividing the data into three equal parts on the basis of volume, and then
calculating  the average  premium  earned  for the high-,  medium-,  and  low-premium
commercial  markets. The average premium was $27.21 per tonne for the highest third
of sales, $8.28 per tonne for the middle third, and $1.67 per tonne for the lowest third.
KFT provide very little data on price premia for sales into EEP-affected markets. Lack-
ing specific data for the EEP markets, we assumed that the price premia in the high-,
5 Full details on the simulation model and results from sensitivity analysis are available from the authors upon request.
6In the crop year 1991/92, 75% of all wheat production fell within the #1 grade. As reported by KFT, the average premium
obtained for #1 CWRS was $12.42 per tonne, only slightly greater than the average premium obtained for all grades of $10.10
per tonne.
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medium-, and low-premium EEP markets were the same as in the high-, medium-, and
low-premium commercial  markets. The premia were applied to an average f.o.b. farm
price of $100 per tonne.7
By assuming that observed  price  discrimination  reflects  revenue-maximizing  be-
havior, we are able to calculate an implicit linear demand curve the CWB faced in each
market. This required an additional assumption about the demand elasticity in  one
of the markets. We assumed the elasticity of demand for Canadian wheat in the low-
premium market was -20. (We also tried a value of -5,  which changed the empirical
results but not the qualitative findings.) Using this elasticity and the price and quantity
in that market, we calculated the marginal revenue as well as the slope and intercept
of the demand curve  in that market.  Then, assuming the same  marginal revenue in
every other market, given the prices and quantities, we could derive the elasticities and
slopes  and  intercepts  of all the other  demand  curves  as well.  The results  of these
calculations  are  presented  in table  2.  Note  that domestic  demand  is very  elastic,
reflecting the lack of border restrictions and the potential for imports from the United
States.
The Simulations
The actual export policies of the CWB and hypothetical export subsidies are compared
under the demand conditions for Canadian wheat that prevailed in the 1991/92 crop
year. More specifically, we examine the economic effects of providing the same producer
income  as under  the  CWB,  but through  a targeted  or  nontargeted  export  subsidy
instead. In each non-CWB scenario, we examine the influence of market power of middle-
men.
A "free-market solution" with no intervention is used as the benchmark for compar-
ison of export policies. A different benchmark is derived under each of three alternative
scenarios  defined in terms  of market power  of middlemen:  (a) a base  scenario, with
modest market power; (b) a competitive scenario, with no market power of middlemen;
and (c)  a less-competitive  scenario, with greater market power of middlemen.
In the base scenario, middlemen are assumed to possess both oligopoly and oligopsony
market power within the Canadian wheat industry, and the market power indexes are
defined as  -i  = 0  = 0.05, reflecting  a very modest amount of market power on both the
buying and selling sides. In the competitive  case, the market power indexes are zero,
and the supply price and the selling price converge to a single value, reflecting the law
of one price. In the less-competitive  case, the market power indexes are increased to
0.10, in order to reflect an increase in market power.
In each scenario (base, competitive, or less-competitive) we simulate the market out-
comes for four policy cases: (a) a free market (with no CWB or any other intervention),
(b) the CWB,  (c) a targeted export subsidy, and (d) a flat, nontargeted export subsidy.
The CWB  simulation serves merely to reproduce the prices and quantities reported in
table 2.  It  is implicitly assumed that the marketing costs, including all farm-to-port
handling  costs, are equal under the CWB and both the free-market  solution and the
7 This reflects the actual realized farm price in the 1991/92  crop year, although the slopes of the demand curves are inde-
pendent of the pricing point chosen.
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Table 2. Parameters of Supply and Demand for CWRS Wheat, 1991/92 Crop
Year
Price  Quantt  Market Parameters Price  Quantity
Description  ($/t)  (000s t)  Elasticity  Intercept  Slope
Demand:
Canada  112.33  1,343  -2.54  156.5  -0.03289
United States  112.81  582  -2.53  157.5  -0.07671
Food Aid  153.00  382  -1.80  237.8  -0.22218
Commercial High-Premium  140.21  2,436  -1.95  212.3  -0.02957
Commercial Medium-Premium  121.28  2,365  -2.28  174.4  -0.02246
Commercial Low-Premium  114.67  2,614  -2.47  161.2  -0.01779
EEP High-Premium  97.29  4,217  -3.34  126.4  -0.00691
EEP Medium-Premium  78.36  4,094  -7.68  88.6  -0.00249
EEP Low-Premium  71.75  4,524  -20.00  75.3  -0.00079
Supply:  100.14  22,557  1.00  0.0  0.00444
Source:  Calculated based on estimates from Kraft,  Furtan, and Tyrchniewicz (p. 42, figure 4.3.2).
Notes: EEP = $42.92/tonne; prices are in U.S. dollars per metric tonne; and quantities are in metric tonnes.
export subsidy.8 The costs of occasional CWB deficits are also ignored as no deficit occur-
red in the 1991/92 crop year.  Because the CWB sets both the purchase price and the
selling price in each market, market power in the grain industry does not play a role in
the CWB solution.
The simulation for the targeted export subsidy program solves for the least-cost set
of targeted export subsidies to provide the same support to producers as under the CWB.
These subsidies are modeled as shifts in the demand curves perceived by firms selling
into the targeted markets. Market power of the grain industry continues to operate in
these simulations.  The simulation for the flat export subsidy solves for the amount of
a  common export  subsidy that would be  required  to support producers  at the CWB
prices. In this case, all export demand curves are shifted by a common  amount.
The economic effects of each policy are analyzed using standard measures of producer
surplus, domestic (Marshallian) consumer surplus, marketing firm profits, and taxpayer
costs. Taxpayer costs are assessed using a 20% marginal deadweight loss from taxation
(6  = 0.2). Transfer efficiency is measured as the total gain in producer surplus divided
8 The assumption that marketing costs would be equal between the CWB and free-market  scenarios is dubious. For in-
stance, Carter and Loyns contend that the CWB costs Canadian farmers an additional CAN$31.65 per tonne of wheat, which,
if true, would more than outweigh any likely benefits from price discrimination (see Schmitz, Furtan, and Baylis). It is not
our purpose to compare  the CWB and free trade, but rather to compare the CWB and export subsidies as mechanisms  for
supporting wheat producers. In making this comparison,  we do not count the costs of administration and so forth associated
with either the CWB or the hypothetical  export subsidy alternative. In both our theoretical analysis and the application  to
the CWB,  we do not account  for additional  marketing costs and other X-efficiency  losses arising from the elimination  of
competition by the creation of an STE, which we suspect might be significant in the case of the CWB. This means our analysis
is biased in favor of the STE relative to the export subsidy; on the other hand, neither do we count the additional costs associ-
ated with the administration  of an export subsidy scheme, including administration and rent seeking.
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by the total loss in taxpayer and consumer surplus and in profits to middlemen (i.e., the
amount transferred  to producers  divided by the cost of the transfer  borne by other
domestic groups).
Simulation Results
The results of the simulations are reported in table 3. The first three numeric columns
in table 3 represent the different market scenarios in terms of market power of middle-
men,  and the fourth (labeled "reduced price spread") shows the effects of cutting the
premia and EEP values in half, relative to the base, but maintaining the assumption of
modest market power, as in the base case. The first block in the table shows the increase
in producer  price, relative  to free trade, required  to achieve the same  protection  as
under the actual  CWB, under each market scenario;  the corresponding increases  in
production and producer  surplus are also shown. To achieve the same producer price
level requires a different price increase given the different market power scenarios. It
can be seen that relative to the free market, the CWB provides the largest transfer to
producers when the middlemen possess the greatest market power. The gains to pro-
ducers from the CWB are $431 million when the market power indexes are 0.1 versus
$220 million when there is no middleman market power. This reflects the result that the
introduction of the CWB not only allows price discrimination among markets, but it also
eliminates middleman profits.
Holding these producer benefits constant within each column, the next three blocks in
table 3 show the outcomes for prices and welfare of consumers, taxpayers, and middle-
men, and thus transfer efficiency,  under each of the three alternative policies. We
measure Canadian surplus and transfer efficiency, assuming that the middlemen are
Canadians. A second measure of transfer efficiency,  denoted (b), does not count middle-
men as Canadians, and is discussed at the end of this section.
The CWB policy does not involve any taxpayer losses, but does involve modest losses
to domestic consumers. The transfer efficiency of the CWB is greater than one because
the gain to producers exceeds the cost to domestic consumers and middlemen combined.
Transfer efficiency is highest where middlemen possess no market power. This is at first
surprising, but can be understood in terms of the role of middlemen. Losses to middle-
men add to the denominator of the measure of transfer efficiency. These losses are zero
in the competitive case, but in the less-competitive  or base cases, middlemen are able
to exploit foreign consumers-so  some of the middleman profits represent net domestic
gains. Since these preexisting benefits from market power are foregone in the transition
to the CWB case, the national gains from introducing the capacity to price discriminate
are commensurably reduced. Even when the market power indexes are as low as 0.05,
over half of the producer surplus gain from the CWB comes from the loss in middleman
profits. In contrast, the export subsidy programs increase middleman profits.
Now consider the targeted export subsidy. This policy implicitly taxes some export
markets by subsidizing others. Thus, there is potential for a net gain in domestic welfare
as  a result  of the  selective  subsidization  of export  markets.  It  can  be  seen  that
introducing the targeted export subsidy, relative to free trade, would achieve such a net
gain, and  hence  the transfer  efficiency  is again  greater  than  1.0,  even  with a  20%
deadweight loss from  general taxation (6  = 0.2),  except in the less-competitive  case.
Alston and GrayJournal  ofAgricultural and  Resource Economics
Table 3.  Simulation Results: Changes from Free-Market Scenario
Market Scenario
Less-  Perfectly  Reduced
Description  Base  Competitive  Competitive  Price Spread
Producer Effects,  All  Policies:
Producer price increase  ($/t)  13.63  17.56  9.31  11.16
Increase in production  (OOOs t)  3,071  3,957  2,097  2,513
Change in producer surplus ($000s)  328,381  430,843  219,767  265,759
CWB Simulation:
Consumer price increase ($/t)  18.37  15.53  21.50  11.02
Change in consumption  (OOOs t)  -559  -472  -654  -602
Change in consumer surplus ($000s)  -19,536  -17,192  -21,844  -11,483
Change in middleman surplus ($000s)  -154,913  -282,300  0  -129,525
Change in Canadian surplus ($000s)  159,931  131,352  197,932  124,751
Transfer efficiency (a)  1.88  1.44  10.06  1.88
Transfer efficiency (b)  16.81  25.06  10.06  23.14
Targeted Export Subsidy:
Consumer price increase ($/t)  13.63  17.56  9.31  11.16
Change in consumption  (OOOs t)  -415  -534  -283  -609
Change in consumer surplus ($000s)  -15,477  -18,895  -11,186  -11,590
Change in taxpayer surplus ($000s)  -291,361  -460,448  -146,694  -184,101
Change in middleman surplus ($000s)  13,919  44,021  0  8,818
Change in Canadian surplus ($000s)  21,543  -48,499  61,887  70,068
Transfer efficiency (a)  1.12  0.99  1.39  1.42
Transfer efficiency (b)  1.18  1.03  1.50  1.52
Flat Export Subsidy:
Consumer price increase ($/t)  13.63  17.56  9.31  11.16
Change in consumption  (000s t)  -415  -534  -283  -609
Change in consumer surplus ($000s)  -15,477  -18,895  -11,186  -11,590
Change in taxpayer surplus ($000s)  -527,414  -707,216  -350,652  -382,350
Change in middleman surplus ($000s)  38,220  95,386  0  38,862
Change in Canadian surplus ($000s)  -214,510  -295,267  -142,071  -128,181
Transfer efficiency (a)  0.65  0.68  0.61  0.75
Transfer efficiency (b)  0.60  0.59  0.61  0.67
Notes: Taxpayer surplus costs are calculated as 1.2 times subsidy expenditure.  Transfer efficiency (a) is
the producer benefit divided by the sum of costs borne by taxpayers, consumers, and middlemen (benefits
are negative  costs); transfer efficiency  (b) leaves middleman effects out. In the "base" case, the market
power parameters  are  0.05.
Transfer efficiency decreases as the market power of middlemen increases, and in the
less-competitive  case  the introduction  of the targeted  export  subsidy implies a net
welfare loss, a transfer efficiency less than 1.0. As with the introduction of the CWB, the
domestic gains  from government  action are  lower when Canadian firms  are already
exploiting the potential to price discriminate  among markets. Finally, it was suggested
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earlier that, for a given amount of transfer to producers, the CWB might tax domestic
consumers more than export subsidies. This is true for the case of competitive  middle-
men and for the base case, but not with increased market power.
The transfer efficiency of the flat subsidy policy is much lower than that of either of
the  policies  that involve  price  discrimination  among markets,  and  the  ranking  is
reversed. With the flat subsidy, transfer efficiency is higher the less competitive  is the
market.
Some further reversals of rankings arise when we consider the alternative measure
of transfer efficiency, denoted (b) in table 3, which excludes benefits and costs to middle-
men. The most striking effect is the increase in transfer efficiency under the CWB in the
cases with imperfect competition. These and the other changes in results are interesting
and are likely to be explicable in terms of the implications for deadweight  losses from
market power when powerful firms and policies interact. Understanding the specifics
is difficult, however, since the transfer to producers (among other things) changes when
we change the degree  of assumed market power of middlemen.
Conclusion
Theoretical analysis suggests that export subsidies are similar in many ways to a policy
of creating a marketing board with sole  export powers.  First, both policies result in
producers receiving a single price for all sales that is greater than the competitive price.
Second,  both policies result in higher prices being charged to consumers in countries
where demand is relatively inelastic, typically including the domestic market. Third,
both policies would be optimized by equating marginal revenues among the markets but,
because of pooling (and effective output subsidies), marginal revenue is less than mar-
ginal cost. Fourth, both policies involve a burden on domestic consumers-at least when
the domestic demand is relatively inelastic, which is likely to be a common  case.
Some important differences lie in the sources  of funds and the implications  of the
different  sources  of funds for the incidence  of costs and benefits.  The export  subsidy
involves  taxpayer funds, and, if these funds involve a large enough  marginal excess
burden (6 > 0), the export subsidy could be a less efficient way of supporting producers;
if 6  =  0,  the  export  subsidy is clearly  more efficient.  Since  taxpayer funds  are not
involved, if a marketing board is to achieve the same benefit for producers, it must raise
revenue from consumers.
In the case where price discrimination  among foreign markets is not possible,  and
domestic  demand is less elastic  than foreign demand, the marketing board  will tax
domestic  consumers  more heavily,  and this means  exports  must be subsidized  at  a
greater rate, on average,  compared  with the export subsidy. In turn, this means the
burden on third-country exporters is greater from the marketing board than from the
export  subsidy.  Relative  to  the  marketing  board,  the transfer  efficiency  of  export
subsidies can be higher or lower, in terms of benefits to producers per dollar of harm to
domestic consumers  and taxpayers, but it cannot be lower in terms of benefits to pro-
ducers per dollar of harm to third countries.
At first, this new result may appear to be somewhat surprising. However, countries
with wheat marketing boards  (Australia,  Canada,  and,  in the past, Argentina) have
tended to offer lower rates of producer protection than countries using export subsidies
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(notably the United States and the European Union). This may have masked the fact
that, for a given rate of protection to producers, the marketing board requires a higher
effective rate of export subsidy. It is also true that those countries using export subsidies
did so in the context of a range of policies for supporting producer incomes, including
domestic price supports.
In the more general case, where price discrimination among international markets
is possible, the effects are more ambiguous. The extent to which domestic price discrim-
ination can be used to achieve  a particular  support level is a function of the relative
elasticities and the sizes of the various markets. Our simulation results showed that,
compared with targeted export subsidies (and even more so, compared with a flat export
subsidy),  price  discrimination  and pooling  is a  much more  efficient  mechanism  for
supporting  Canadian  wheat producers.  The  comparison among the different  policies
does not  depend qualitatively  on the degree  of competition  in the wheat  marketing
industry, but that is partly because  we have assumed middleman  profits are part of
Canada's benefits. If we were to attach no weight to middleman profits, the CWB option
would be even more attractive in terms of transfer efficiency.
The simulation model illustrates and reinforces the theoretical results, but the partic-
ular results are dependent on additional modeling assumptions and the specific values
used for parameters. In recent years there has been some contention over the extent to
which  the CWB  can price  discriminate  among markets,  and  whether the  potential
revenue gains to producers from the exercise  of sole export powers would outweigh the
additional cost from restricting competition in wheat marketing (e.g., see Carter, Loyns,
and Berwald, and studies they cite).
Our analysis has not allowed for any effects of an STE on marketing costs, nor for any
differences in costs of administration, enforcement, compliance, and other costs among
the policies; hence, our illustrative estimates  overstate the net benefits from the CWB
relative  to no policy,  and (probably) relative  to export  subsidies.  Further, while our
estimates of the benefits  from price  discrimination  are  based on the only published
estimates of CWB price premia, the estimated premia  are large and have been chal-
lenged. To address this concern, we also report results with more conservative estimates
of the premia, and it can be seen that our results are robust with respect to this aspect.
Finally, previous work in this area has generally presumed that the relevant alternative
to an STE is a market with perfect competition,  even though a primary justification for
statutory marketing authorities  has been countervailing  market power.  Our results
show that even  quite mild departures  from  perfect competition  can have important
implications for the evaluation of the economic effects of an STE and for the comparison
with alternative policies for transferring income to producers, such as export subsidies.
[Received May 1999; final  revision received  November 1999.]
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